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Real exchange rate appreciation usually accom-  exchange rate-based disinflation affects expendi-
panies stabilization programs based on the ex-  ture switching and re'luction when wages are
change rate.  One thing that causes the real  partially indexed in some segments of the iabor
exchange rate to appreciate is the capital inflows  market.
that follow liberalization of the capital account
and the financial market.  An altemative policy restricting capital
inflows to a lower level would have led to a pro-
Capital inflows cause the exchange rate to  portionately larger decline in absorption than in
appreciate in part because of the resulting  income - and the decline in absorption would
increase in expenditures.  This appreciation is  have fallen disproportionately more on con-
exacerbated if there is some price rigidity - as,  sumption than on investment.
for instance, when wages are indexed - and if
control of the money supply is only partial.  All  The authors also show the extent to which a
these conditions existed during Chile's experi-  more flexible rule on wage indexing would have
ment with exchange rate-based disinflation  offset the adverse impact of lower capital flows
between 1978 and 1981.  on protected sector employment.
Simulating what might have been (using an  This paper is forthcoming in the Journal of
econometric model), the authors study how  Development Economics.
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I.  Introduction
The  use of  exchange  rate-based  disinflation  gained  much support  in
the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s  especially  among  semi-industrial  countries
wishing  to avoid  the  usual  contractionary  effects  of orthodox  stabilization
policies. The  theoretical  literature on  this  topic  is  vast,  ranging  from
intuitive  reasoning  (Dornbusch  1982,  1985)  to  more formal  analysis  (Helpman
and  Razin,  1987). This  paper  adds to the  less  extensive  body  of empirical
work examining  one  aspect  of  exchange  rate-based  disinflation;  namely,  how
it  affects  the  composition  of  expenditure  switching  and  expenditure
reduction  adjustment  in the presence of  partial wage indexation  in some
segments  of the  labor  markets. The  analysis  is  carried  out  for  Chile  where
exchange  rate-based disinflation  policy was  actively pursued for  four
years.
In February  1978  Chile  adopted the  policy  of pre-announcement  of
the  exchange  rate (the  active crawling peg)  to reduce  inflation.  At the
same  time,  restrictions  on  medium  and  long-term  capital  flows  were relaxed.
The  authorities  devalued,  at  a  decreasing pace, until  June  1979  when  the
value  of the  peso  was fixed.  Also at that  time  legislation  was introduced
statir-  that  wage indexation for workers  subject  to  collective  bargaining
(essentially  all  workers  outside of  agriculture  and  some  services)  would
begin  to have  as  a  floor the  previous twelve  months'  rate  of inflation
(backward  wage  indexation,  based  on  a  maximum of  100  percent  of the
previous  year's  inflation,  had  been in  place  since  November  1974). Capital
inflows  increased  after  the  establishment  of  the  active  crawling  peg system
and  further  accelerated  after  the  fixing  of the  exchange  rate  in  June  1979.
The  current  account  deficit  rose  steadily to reach  a staggering  152  of  GDP
in 1981.  1/2
The  paper  re-examines  two  of  the  remaining  controversies  about
Chile's  policies  during  this  period.  The  first  relates  to the  extent  the
loss  of competitiveness  that  resulted from Chile's  exchange  rate  policy
would  have  been  tempcred had  Chile  followed a  more restrictive  external
borrowing  policy  bv not liberalizing  the  capital  account  of the  balance  of
payments.  The  second relates to  the  high unemployment levels  that
persisted during Chile's economic boom.  Productivity increases  that
accompanied  the  tariff dismantling  are  partly responsible  for  the  high
unemployment,  but  the  issue of  how  sensitive employment  was to  wages
remains. The  first  issue  is  analyzed in  the  context  of a  model  where  the
domestic  savings  rate  is linked to  the  level  of external  borrowing. The
second  issue  is  treated  in  the  context of a  Phillips  curve  and  a portfolio
model  which  links  the  money  supply to  capital  inflows. These  augmented
linkages  more realistically  portray the  response of  employment  to more
"reasonable"  levels  of capital  inflows.  The  empirical  analysis  is  carried
out  with a five-sector  simulation  model  that  emphasizes  the  implications  of
adjustments  in domestic  savings  behavior to  lower  capital  inflows  and the
implications  of  partial wage  rigidity on  employment and  macroeconomic
equilibrium.  2/
From  a  more  general perspective,  the  paper  shows  how  certain
macroeconomic  phenomena  can  be approximately  incorporated  into  an otherwise
microeconomic  general  equilibrium  analysis.  The  approximation  is  ad hoc
but it  fits  the  Chilean stylized facts  relatively  well and  suggests  other
applications.  Section  II introduces a  one-sector  model  that  includes  the
major  features  of  the  more  detailed model  from which  are  derived  the
simulations  reported  in  section  III.  The  simulations  from  the  five  sector
model  show  that  the  loss in  GDP  growth would  have  been small,  even  for3
large  cuts  in  foreign capital inflows.  Macro-micro linkages  via the
determination  of the  price  level and  the  labor-market  specification  are
explored,  again  in a  one  sector model,  in  section IV.  The  simulation
results  from  the  resulting expanded five  sector model  show  a favorable
employment-inflation  tradeoff  to lower capital inflows in 1980  and  l981.
Conclusions  follow  in section  V.
II.  Capital  Inflows,  the  Real  Exchange  Rate  and  Investment:
A One-Sector  Analysis
Consider  an economy  which  has  to  adjust  to a reduction  in capital
inflows. The standard  Salter-Swan  analysis  indicates  that  if  there  is full
wage and  non-tradable  price  flexibility,  a real  exchange  rate  depreciation
will  be  necessary provided that nontradable  and  tradables are  gross
substitutes  in  consumption  (the  usual  case).  If,  on the  other  hand,  there
is some  degree  of  price  inflexibility  then, as shown  by Jones  and  Corden
(1976)  for  the  case of  fixed nominal wages,  there  is an indeterminancy
because  the new  equilibrium  will  lie  inside the  (full-employment  all
markets  cleared)  production  possibility  curve.
In the  standard analysis no  distinction  is  made  between  the
various  components  of absorption.  This  precludes  taking  into  consideration
contributions  to the  analysis  of  the  current  account  which  have  emphasized
the  usefulness  of  modelling  adjustments  in savings  and investment  behavior
(e.g.  Sachs  1981,  and  Svensson and  Razin  1983).  Implications  for  the
current  account  of real exchange rates  temporarily  in  disequilibrium  have
also  focused  on savings  and  investment  behavior  (Dornbusch  1985).
We introduce now  a  one-sector simplified  version of the  more
complex  multi-sector  model  used  in  section III.  The  key features  of the4
model  ares  (1) a  fixed  real wage  to  reflect wage  indexation;  and
(2)  private  savings  depend  negatively on  capital inflows.  The  model  is
useful  to show  the  implications  of the  postulated  private  savings  behavior
on investment  (and  hence  on  medium-term  growth)  when there  is a reduction
in capital  flows. To save on  notation,  time  subscripts  are  omitted. The
model  consists  of  equations  (l)-(12)  below.
(1)  XD  =  f(L;  K)  Production  function
(2)  W - Of/IL  Labor  demand
(3)  E/D  - g(eSPE/PD)  Export  supply
(4)  HID  - h(e*PM/PD)  Import  demand
(5)  F = PMOM  - PE-E  External  balance
(6)  XD  =  k(D,  E)  Composite  output
(7)  X - l(D,M)  Composite  expenditure
(8)  PS*XD  - PDeD  +  ePEOE  Income
(9)  POX  - PD*D  +  ePOM*  Absorption
(10)  P.C - PS-XD - S  Consumption
(11)  P*I  - S  + eF  Investment
(12)  S - S(PS*XD,  eF)  Savings  function5
where  XD - output; L - employment;  W  - fixed real product wage  (i.e.
W  - W PS); K - (putty  clay) capital; D,  E  - output  for domestic  and
export  markets  respectively;  M-  imports;  e  =  the  price  of  foreign  exchange
in  domestic  currency  units;  F  - exogenous  transfer  of purchasing  power
(i.e.  net  capital  inflows)  meacur,d  in  foreign  currency  units;  PM,  PE  - 1
exogenous  world  prices  of  imports  and  exports  (reflecting  the  small  country
assumption);  k and  1  are  respectively  the  CET  and  CES  aggregator  functions
for  composite  output  and composite  expenditure;  PS, P  - prices  of  the
composites;  C,  I  =  consumption  and investment. The  first  distinctive
feature  of  the model is the assumption  of product  differentiation  for
exports  (via  the  constant elasticity  of  transformation  --  i.e.  CET  --
function  in  equation  6)  and imports  (via the  CES  aggregation  function  in
equation  7).  This assumption  is supported  by  detailed  microeconometric
evidence  (Morande,  1985) and is largely  responsible  for  why  the  multi-
sector  model  tracks  the large structural  shifts  observed  in  Chile  during
1977-81  relatively  well  (see  Condon,  Corbo,  de Melo,  1985).  The  second
distinctive  feature  is the assumption,  embodied  in equation  12,  that
domestic  savings  is negatively  related  to foreign  capital  inflows  (i.e.
82  <  0)- Econometric  evidence  supporting  this formulation  is  provided
below.  The  model  is homogeneous  of degree  zero in  prices  so  that  only
relative  prices  are determined,  and PD serves  as numeraire. In  this
formulation  changes  in  e  approximate  changes  in  the  real  exchange  rate.
Fixing  the  real  product  wage dichotomizes  the system:  equations
(1)  and  (2)  determine  employment  and  output.  For  a  given  output  level,  XD,
equations  (3)  - (6)  co-determine  equilibrium  imports,  exports,  domestic  use
of  output  and  the  real  exchange  rate. Equilibrium  is  depicted  in  figure  la
as  the  intersection  of  the  external  balance  equation  FF) and  the  allocation6
Figure  1:
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schedule  for  domestic  sales,  D(e:  XD).  The  FF  curve  slopes  upward  because,
at a given  real  exchange  rate,  a  diversion  of sales  from  the  export  market
to the  domestic  market  creates  excess  demand  for  foreign  exchange,  which  is
eliminated  by a real  exchange rate depreciation.  The  slope  of D(e;  XD)
reflects  the  fact  that  thG  allocation  of output  to  the  domestic  market  is
negatively  related  to the  real  exchange  rate. A reduction  in the  capital
flows  shifts  FF rightward  and  a decrease  in  the  real  wage shifts  D(e;  XD)
rightward.
Figure  lb shows  the  implications  of the  assumption  about  domestic
savings  behavior for  investment taking output as  fixed.  If domestic
savings  is independent  of  capital inflows, real  investment  is positively
related  to a change  in  e by  virtue  of the  revaluation  (in  domestic  currency
units)  of the  net  foreign transfer.  (The revaluation  effect  was first
noted  by Hirschman,  1948). This  effect  is  mitigated  by the  assumption  that
domestic  savings  is  negatively  related  to the  size  of the  transfer  (s 2<0).
Note  that  from  equation  (11)  a decrease  in the  foreign  transfer,  F, shifts
the  investment  line  downward and  the  shift  is  greater  when there  is  no
offsetting  change  in  domestic  savings  (i.e.  62  =  0).
We can  now  depict  the  effect of a reduction  in foreign  transfers.
As shown  in the  top  quadrant,  the  FF schedule  shifts  rightward  resulting  in
a real  exchange  rate  depreciation.  The  medium  term  implications  are  found
by tracing  the  new real  exchange rate, el,  to the  lower  figure  and  seeing
where  it intersects  the  new  investment line, I'(s2 < 0).  This  new lower
investment  level,  Il,  is,  however,  greater than  it  would  be in the  absence
of the  assumption  that  the  domestic  savings  rate  rises  to offset  reductions
in foreign  savings. (In  figure  lb,  Ii  is  the  investment  level  that would
result in the case  where 82  G  0).8
There  are  two  other  channels  through  which  a  reduction  in  foreign
capital  inflows  affects  macroeconomic  equilibrium.  First,  the  multisector
model  captures  the effect  of a  change  in the relative  price  between
tradables  and  nontradables  on the cost of a  unit  of  composite  capital
equipment  installed  in each sector,  and hencz on the volume  of  real
investment.  This  allows  us  to capture  the  construction  boom  that  occurred
(Corbo,  1986).  Second,  as explained  below,  the real  consumption  wage
rather  than  the  real  product  wage is  fixed,  which  complicates  the  outcome
because  output  is  no longer  fixed because  the real  product  wage  is  t
fixed.  It  remains  that the main determinants  of how  the  economy  :411
adjust  to lower foreign  transfers  are the extent  of short-run  price
rigidity  and  the  domestic  savings  response  to  variations  in  the  net  foreign
transfer.  Hence  we  shall  focus on  the  empirical  characterization  of  these
two  channels.
III. Capital  Inflows  and  the  Real  Exchange  Rate: A  Multisector  Analysis
During  the  boom  years of 1977-81,  high  unemployment  rates  (above
1OZ)  coexisted  with  rising  real wages.  The  consensus  (see  Edwards  1986,
Riveros  1986)  is  that  the high unemployment  levels  of  the  late  seventies
are  not  explained  by  changes  in labor  participation  rates,  but  rather  by
the extreme  real wage  rigidity that resulted  from automatic  wage
indexation.  The  stylized  representation  of the labor  market  which  most
closely  fits  the  facts  is the segmented  labor  market  hypothesis  (see  e.g.
Stiglitz,  1982).  Edwards  (1986) .,ives  evidence  that labor  market
adjustment  during  the period  is consistent  with the hypothesis  that
unemployment  is  involuntary  with respect  to the  protected  segment  of  the
market  covered  by wage indexation,  but voluntary  with respect  to  the9
remaining  (free)  segment. In the  model  the  free  segment  is approximated  by
agriculture  and  social,  personal and  domestic services,  with the  rest  of
the  economy  in the  protected segment.  Wages  in the  primary  sector  and
other  services  sectors  clear  the  market. Wages  in  the  protected  sector  are
fixed  in  terms  of the  cost  of  living index.  3/  For  the  protected  sector,
the  average  wage in  period  t,  WAt is  given  by:
(13)  WAt/VA  t_i  G  1  +  7  (  (Pt/Tt1-1  )
where  7  =  1, and  it is  the  CPI  index  defined  below.
Gross  investment  is set  equal  to  total  national  savings:
(14)  TINV =  S- +  SG +  CA*ER
where (SG)  is government  saving,  CA is  the  current  account  deficit and  ER
is the  price  of foreiga  exchange. Real  gross  private  saving, SpIP,  is  a
function  of real  disposable  income  Y, and  foreign  capital  inflows  denomina-
ted  in  pesos,  F2 *  ER.  After  correcting  for  heteroskedasticity,  the  esti-
mated  equation  over  the  period  1960-81  gives  the  following  results:
(15)  S /P  =  1.7  +  .16  Y  - .39  (F2 *  ER) /  P
P  (.15) (4.55)  (3.50)
where  t-statistics  are  reported  in parentheses.  This  equation  is  a proxy
for  several  adjustment  channels  not  directly  captured  in the  model.  4/  One
is  that  capital inflows lowered the  real interest rate,  thus  raising10
expenditure.  Second,  insofar  as the  real  exchange  rate  appreciation  caused
by the  capital inflow was  viewed as  temporary,  consumers would  have
substituted  present  for  future  expenditure in  durables,  which  in Chile  are
imported  or import-competing.
Although  the  sustained current account deficit  corresponded  to
changes  in  private  savings  and  investment,  the  model  includes  a government
sector.  Government savings is  derived by  subtracting  exogenous  real
government  spending  on goods and  services from  total  government  revenue.
Foreign  savings  is  equal  to  the  current account deficit. The  model  has
five  sectors, and  is  calibrated to  1977,  the  base  year.  The  key
elasticities  are  the  elasticitias  of  substitution  in  the  production
functions,  the  trade  substitution elasticities,  and  the  export
transformation  elasticities (see table  1).  All  elasticities  are  best
guesses but  sensitivity  analyses from earlier work  suggest they  are
reasonable  values. Equilibrium  is  defined as a set  of relative  prices  for
goods  and  factors  such  that  excese  demand  in  all  markets  is zero.  5/
In  the  multisector  model  the  real  exchange  rate,  e, is  defined  as:
(i  i  Pi  +  i  Pi)E
(16)  e =  E
EW'  PD
ii  i
where  the  i  subscript refers to  oectors, superscripts  m,  e, x denote
imports,  exports  and  domestic  production  respectively,  the  W's  are  variable
quantity  weights  (summing to  unity), and  all  variable  mnemonics  are  as
defined  in section II.  Finally, the numeraire, which  is  set  to the
observed  CPI index,  is given  by:11
Table  1:  PARAMETERS  AND  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  CHILEAN  ECONOMY  IN 1977
Primary  Copper  Manufacturing  Construction  Services
SectornI  share.  in
total  output  (percent)  11.1  6.9  87.2  4.8  41.5
Ratio  of  Imports  to
doestic goods  (percent)  27.2  8.8  87.6  0.0  8.9
Value-added  ratio  .64  .66  .80  .49  .U4
Ratio  of  Imported  inter-
meiate.  to  total  lntr-
mediate  Input.  (percent)  14.6  17.4  17.5  24.0  14.9
Depreciation  rate.  8.5  8.6  8.6  8.0  8.5
Ratio  of  exports  total
output  (percent)  10.6  88.6  7.0  0.0  4.6
Capital-labor  ratio  0.4  1.2  0.2  0.7  0.4
Capital  labor  elasticity
of  substitution  0.9  0.9  1.2  1.6  1.5
Trado  substitution
elasticity  !/  8.0  8.0  8  0  0.6  0.5
Export transformtion
elasticity  k/  8.0  2.0  8.0  2.0  2.0
/  The  trade  substitution  elasticity  to  the compensated  price  elosticity  of  demand  for
Imports.
The  export  transformation  elasticity  In the compensated  priceo  elsticity  of  supply  of
exports.
Note:  The  trade  substitution  and  export  tronsformation  elesticitie.  are  not  Independent.  For
thoir  relation  mm de  MUlo  and  Robinson  (forthcoming).12
(17)  p  Ei  Pi
ii
where  the  Di are  fixed  quantity  weights. The  model  endogenously  determines
the  equilibrium  real exchange rate consistent  with  different  levels  of
capital  inflows. The  model-predicted  relation  between  capital  inflows  and
the  real  exchange rate  is  shown  in  Table 2.  The  real  exchange  rate
appreciation  predicted  by the  model  is  close  to other  estimates  (see  e.g.
Corbo,  1985). Note  the  acceleration  that occurred in  1980  --  the  first
full  year  when the  rate  of  crawl  of  the  nominal  exchange  rate  was zero  and
total  capital  inflows  began  rising  dramatically.
Table  2:  CAPITAL INFLOWS  AND  THE REAL EXCHANGE  RATE IN  THE BASE RUN
Cumulative
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1977-81
Exogenous  total
capital  inflow  1/  530  1,150  1,590  3,140  5,320  11,730
Endogenous  real
exchange  rate
index  2/  100  97  96  90  82  --
1/  Millions  of dollars.
2/  1977  - 100.13
To simulate  the  response  of the  economy  to  lower  levels  of capital
inflows,  the  total  capital  inflow  in  table 2 for  1980  and  1981  is reduced
by 10?,  252,  and  502 (experiments  E-1, E-2,  and  E-3 respectively).  At the
initial  exchange  rate  there  is excess demand  for  traded  goods. The  extent
of relative  price  adjustment  depends on  the  importance  of capital  inflows
in total  absorption  and  on the  relative  import  intensity  of consumption  and
investment  expenditures.  In 1980,  capital  inflows  represezrted  about  102  of
absorption  in  Chile.
Adjustment  occurs  mainly  through  expenditure  reduction.
Expenditure  is reduced  by  (1) the  fall in  capital inflows,  and (2)  an
increase  in  unemployment  because  of real  wage rigidity. Real  wage rigidity
thus  implies  that  external  balance  comes at  the  expense  of an increase  in
unemployment.  It  also  implies that compositional  shifts  in  demand  are
minimal  (see  figure  2,  quadrant 2).  The  shift  from  consumption  toward
investment  demand  in  1980,  however, raises the  1981  GDP  level  beyond  what
it  would  have  been in  the  absence of the  link  between  domestic  savings  and
capital  inflows.
Table  3  reports the  consequences  for  GDP,  absorption and
nonprimary  employment  of  the  different capital inflow  levels  and  figure  2
traces the  trade--offs  for  the  real  exchange rate  (and hence  the
distribution  of production between tradables and  nontradables),  and  the
composition  of savings  at  different capital inflow levels. The fall  in
absorption  is  much larger  than  the  fall in income. One  reason  for  this  is
the  shift  from consumption  toward  investment demand, which  raises
employment  because  investment goods are  labor  intensive  relative  to the
consumption  bundle. Still,  as  noted  below,  the  employment  consequences  of
the  reduction  in  capital inflows with  a  fixed  real wage are  negative14
Figure  2:
Model  Predicted  Tradeoffs  from  Lower  Capital  Inflows
Real  Exchange
Rate (19  7 - 100)
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overall. Table  3  also  shows that  the  cost  of adjustment  to lower  capital
inflows rises more  than proportionately  with  the  decline in capital
inflows.  6/  This  is  because producers who use  imported  intermediates  as
inputs  find  it increasingly  difficult  to substitute  domestic  intermediates
and  have  to pay  a  higher price  for  imported  intermediates.  As a result,
the  economywide  value  added  to gross  output  ratio  falls.
Table  3: CDP,  ABSORPTION,  AND  NONPRIMARY  EMPLOYMENT  LEVELS  WITH LOWER
CAPITAL  INFLOWS  IN  1980 AND  1981
(percentage  deviation  from  base run)
1980  1981
Capital  Nonprimary  Capital  Nonprimary
Inflows  a/  COP  Absorption  employment  inflows  */  GOP  Absorption  employment
E-1  1.1  --  -2.8  -0.4  1.6  -. 6  -8.8  -0.9
E-2  2.6  -0.6  -5.8  -1.1  8.8  -1.2  -8.5  -2.0
E-3  5.4  -1.5  -11.9  -2.8  7.6  -2.9  -17.5  -4.8
pj  Decline  in  capital  inflows  expressed  as a proportion  of  base  run  CDP.
IV.  Capital  Inflows,  Disinflation  and  Employment
The  active  crawling  peg  disinflation  policy  was partly  thwarted  by
the  inflationary  pressures created by  the  capital inflows since  full
sterilization  of  these inflows could not  be  achieved by the  monetary
authorities  and  part  of the  increased demand fell  on nontraded  goods. It
is  also  likely  that  wages  were  affected by the  expenditure  boom,  adding  a
cost-push  element  to inflationary  forces. We now  turn  to  an examination  of
the  linkages  between  capital inflows, inflation,  wages,  and  employment  by16
adding  macroeconomic  elements  to  the  microeconomic  model. It is  obvious
that  the  macroeconomic  issues  raised  here  are  best  studied  on their  own  but
a  multisector  model  is  eventually  needed if  one  wishes  to study  employment
implications.
As in section  II  we  present the  main features  with  a one-sector
macro  model  which  abstracts from  the  determination  of internal-external
balance  already  covered  in section II.  The  equations  of the  macro  model
are  given  by (18)-(21).
(18)  Hs =  g(F)  ;  g' > 0
(19)  MD - kPy
(20)  y  f(W)  ;  f'.<O
(21)  w=h( 1 >P)  ;  h,>0;  h. > 0
y  p
Following  econometric  evidence  in  Corbo (1986),  we assume  that  the
money  supply  (18) is  partly under  the  control  of  monetary  authorities,
i.e.,  that  there  is less  than  perfect  capital  mobility.  7/  Money  demand  is
given  by the  Cambridge  equation  (19). As before,  real  GDP  is  a decreasing
function of  the  real wage  in  the  sector  under  wage legislation  (20).
Finally wage  contracts are  given by a Phillips  curve,  where  Y-1 is  the
deviation  of  GDP from  trend  last  period  and  p Is expected  inflation formed
last  period.  8/  Neglecting  lags,  or equivalently  considering  the  effect  of
a change  in F  last period, we  drop  the  tildes  in (21) and  derive  the
aggregate  demand  and  supply schedules by  equating (19) and (20)  and  by17
substituting  (21) into  (20).  The  resulting equilibrium is  shown  in
flgure  3.  The  aggregate  demand  schedule  is downward  sloping,  and  it  can  be
shown  that  the  aggregate supply is  upward sloping  unless  the  effects  of
changes  in  output  have a strong  effect on  wages.  9/  From  the  demand  side,
a reduction  in  capital  inflows  reduces GDP  as in  the  simulations  presented
above. In  addition,  on  the  supply side,  lower  inflation  translates  into
lower  nominal wages  through (21).  For  the  estimated Phillips  curve
coefficients  reported  below  in (22), the  real  wage falls,  which  irplies  a
downward  shift  of  the  aggregate  supply  curve  in figure  3.
Before turning to  the  simulation  experiments,  we  report  the
econometric evidence supporting the  Phillips curve  determination  of
manufacturing  wages  proposed  in (21). After  performing  model  specification
tests  10/  to  choose between  perfect foresight, full backward wage
indexation and  alternatives,  we  settled on  the  following estimates
(corrected  for  first-order  autocorrelation)  derived from  quarterly  data
over  the period 1976(1) - 1982(4):
A  *  A
(22)  WA  * -0.007  +  0.23 (yt-1 - Yt- ) +  1.22 (t-1Pt)
(-0.99) (3.17)  (24.78)
-2 R  - 0.92,  DW - 2.01
where  ^ denotes a  percentage change  between  t and  t-l,  Yt is  GDP,  yt  is
trend  GDP,  and
(23)  t- Pt  = 0.5  pPt1  +  0.5  Pt
This  formulation  encompasses  the  formulation  in (13)  as  a special  case.  II/18
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To  carry out  the  simulations,  we  use  the  estimated offset
coefficient  from  Corbo  (1986,  p. 122).  His  estimate,  using  quarterly  data
from  1975  to 1982  derived from a  three  asset  portfolio  model  similar  to
Kouri  and  Porter  (1974) indicates that  a  10  peso  increase  in  domestic
credit  is  offset  by a 6.8  peso  loss in  reserves. This  implies  a 3.2  peso
increase  in the  money  supply.  Equation  (19)  then  determines  the  new  price
level  associated  with the  lower level of  capital inflows. Because  the
estimated  value  of the  offset coefficient  would  have likely  changed  in  a
regime with  greater capital controls like the  one  implicit in  our
experiments,  we only  report simulations  for  102  and  252  cuts  in  capital
inflows.
To isolate  the  effect  of a lower  level  of capital  inflows  on  wages
and  on  protected sector  employment,  the  base  run  simulation  was
recalibrated  with  protected  sector  wages  determined  by equation  (22)  rather
than  by equation  (13) and  with  the  price  level  determined  by equations
(18)-(21).  The  calibration  results in  a  new  base simulation  where  the
equilibrium real wage  increase is  the  same as  the  one incorporated
exogenously  in  the  base run  reported in  section III. Then  we performed
again  the  simulations  consisting  of  102  and  25%  cuts  in  capital  inflows
during  1980-1. The  results  of the  new  simulations  are  reported  in table  4
in the  form  of ratios  to  the  equilibrium  levels  of the  same  variables  in
the  earlier  set  of  simulation experiments (e.g. the  value  of  97 in  the
upper  left-hand  corner  of table  4  means  that  the  real  wage is  now 3  percent
lower  in 1980  than it  was in  the  corresponding  previous  simulation).20
Table  4:  REAL  WAGES  AND  REAL  GDP  WITH
PHILLIPS  CURVE  WAGE  DETERMINATION  1/
1980  1981
Real  Wage  2/  GDP  Real  Wage 2/  GDP
EXP1  97  101  93  102
EXP2  92  102  82  105
1/  Ratio  to corresponding  values  in table  3 and  figure  2.
2/  Protected  sector.
The  results  indicate  that the  alternative to full  backward  wage
indexation  represented  by equation  (22) would  have resulted  in lower  real
wages  in  the  protected  sector.  Thus,  for  example,  for  a 25Z  decline  in
capital  inflows,  real  wages  in 1981  are  18Z  below  the  level  reached  in the
earlier  experiment.  As a result, GDP  is  5?  higher. The  reason  for  the
lower  real  wages  lies  in  the  replacement  of full  backward  wage indexation
by a  process  linking wage  growth to  current  inflation  and  to deviations
from  trend  growth.  As  a  result, there  is  an  element  of expenditure
switching  in the  economy's response to  deflation  that  was  not previously
accounted  for. This  evidence supports earlier  conjectures  (Corbo,  1986,
Edwards  and  Edwards,  1987) which  blame  the policy  of full  backward  wage
indexation  for  exacerbating  the  output loss resulting  from  the  sharp  fall
in capital  inflows  that  eventually  occurred  in  Chile  in  1982.21
V.  Conclusions
A real exchange rate appreciation  usually  accompanies  exchange
rate-based  stabilization  programs.  One  mechanism that  lends to real
exchange  rate appreciation  is  capital inflows that may follow  capital
account  and  financial  market  liberalizations.  Capital  inflows  lead  to a
real  exchange  rate  appreciation  because part  of  the  resulting  increase  in
expenditures  falls  on domestically  produced goods. The  real  exchange  rate
appreciation  is  exacerbated if  there  is  some price  rigidity, as for
instance,  when there  is wage  indexation,  and  if  money  supply  control  is
partial. All these  features  were  present in the  Chilean  experiment  with
exchange  rate-based  disinflation  between  1978  and  1981.
This  paper has  studied two  effects that accompanied  the  real
exchange  rate appreciation  in  Chile during 1979-81.  First, we give
econometric  and simulation  evidence that  an  alternative  policy  restricting
capital  inflows  to a lower  level  would  have led  to a  proportionately  larger
fall  in absorption  than  in income,  and  the  decline  in absorption  would  have
fallen  disproportionately  more  on consumption  than  on investment.  Second,
we give  econometric  and  simulation  evidence of  the  extent  to  which  a  more
flexible  wage indexation rule would  have  offset the  adverse  impact  on
protected  sector  employment  of lower  capital  inflows.22
Footnotes
1/  During  1977-81  capital  inflows  more  than  financed  the  current  account
deficits,  so  that  the  Central Bank was  accumulating  international
reserves. The  inflows  materialized for  two  reasons. First,  on the
supply  side,  there  was the  gradual liberalization  of the  economy  to
capital  flows  --  starting in  September 1977  when commercial  banks
were allowed  for  the  first  time  to  borrow  externally. Second,  on the
demand  side,  there was  a  portfolio  shift  toward  dollar-denominated
loans  in response  to the  inc-ease  in  the  difference  between  the  peso-
denominated  and  the  dollar-denominated  real interest rate that
resulted  from  fixing  the  exchange rate  (Corbo,  1986). It is likely
that  capital  inflows influenced the  general revaluation  of assets
(the  stock  market  price  index  rose  sevenfold  between  January  1977  and
December  1980).  These  inflows, by  relaxing the  capital  market
disequilibrium,  probably resulted  in  a  perceived increase in
permanent  wealth, which  in  turn  led  to  a  reduction  in domestic
savings.
2/  The  level of  disaggregation  (5  sectors), and  assumptions  about
foreign  trade  elasticities  are  the  same as those  used  in our  earlier
analysis  of reform-induced  productivity  gains  (Condon,  Corbo,  and  de
Melo,  1985).  External closure, labor market  specifications  (and
supporting  evidence)  depart  from  our  previous  analysis.
3i  Commerce,  transportation,  utilities, government and  other  services
comprise  the  aggregate services sector.  Output in the  services
sector  is  a Cobb-Douglas  aggregation  of  fixed-wage  labor  and  flex-
wage labor,  with  shares derived from the  data  in  Edwards  (1986,
appendix).
4/  The  parameter  estimates  are  in  line  with those  reported  in  Weisskopf
(1972). We emphasize that our  equation is  an attempt  to  capture
various  intertemporal  effects that  the  static nature  of the  model
would  otherwise  ignore  (see also Grinols and  Bhagwati  1976). The
formulation  in  equation (14) is  close in  spirit to the  Laursen-
Metzler  (1950)  effect.  The  small country assumption  in our  model
implies  that  changes  in  purchasing  power  via terms-of-trade  changes
must come  exogenously,  whereas in  the  Laursen-Metzler  analysis,  a
devaluation  implies  a terms-of-trade  change.  This is  in line  with
Dornbusch  (1985)  who  gives  forceful  arguments  why  capital  inflows  are
(often  correctly)  perceived by  private agents as transfers  rather
than  loans.
5/  T'he  five  sectors  ares  Primary,  Mining,  Manufacturing,  Construction,
Services. The  solution  strategy  and  algorithms  used  are  described  in
Dervis,  de  Melo,  and  Robinson (1982, appendix  3).  The  complete  set
of  model  equations  is  available  upon  request.
6/  A variant  of  experiment  E-3  in  which  the  coefficient  of (F 2 ER/P)  in
equation  15  is  set  to  zero  results in  a  3.4  percent drop  in
nonprimary  employment  in 1980  compared  with  a drop  of 2.3  percent  in
E-3.23
7/  Quarterly  estimates  (over  the  period  1975-1982)  of  a  portfolio  model
similar  to  Kouri  and  Porter (1974)  gave  strong  empirical  support  for
the  model  with the offset  coefficient  on  domestic  internal  credit
estimated  at  -0.32.
8/  During  the  period  of  analysis,  wage  contracts  in  Chile  were  typically
negotiated  once a  year.  Evidence  supporting  a  Phillips  curve
approach  to  wage  determination  is  given  in  Corbo  (1985)  and  below.
9/  This  is  most unlikely,  especially  in view of the  fact  that  only
approximately  two thirds  of the  labor  market  was under wage
indexation.  The  condition  for  AS  to  be  upward  sloping  in  figure  3  is
(1-hy)  >  0.
10/  The  selection  of  weights  in  determining  price  expectations  formation
in  (23)  was based on the model selection  procedure  suggested  by
Davidson  and  MacKinnon  (1981). We were  able  to  reject  both  perfect
foresight  and  full  backward  wage indexation  when  tested  against  the
"half  and  half*  alternative  adopted  in  (23)  as  a special  case.
l1/  In  (13)  the  coefficient  on  deviation  from  trend  output  is  assumed
to  be  zero,  the  coefficient  on  expected  inflation  one  and  the
A coefficients  on  Apt-,  and  Pt  in  (23)  one  and  zero  respectively.24
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APPENDIX
A.  Model  Equations
This  appendix  sets  out  the  model  equations in  block  form. A bar
on a  variable  indicates  that  the  variable is exogenous. In general,  i  and
j  subscripts  refer  to  sectors (5), and  k  susbcripts refer to labor
categories  (2). Equations  appear in  Table  Al and  corresponding  variables
are  defined  in  Table  A2.
The  simulations  reported  in section  3 involve  equations  (Al)-(A26)
with the  coefficients  reported  in  the  text  in  equation  (15)  in the  text
substituted  into  equation  (A19). In  addition,  the  real  wage for  protected
sector  labor  is  not  determined  by (All)  but  is fixed  as in equation  (13)  in
the  text.
The  simulations  reported in  section 4  require the  following
additional  changes: equation  (13)  of the  text  is replaced  by equation  (22)
of the  text;  and  the  overall price  level  is  endogenously  determined  (along
with the  mone.y  supply)  according  to text  equations  (18)-(19).
B.  Data
The  primary  data  source  is  the  1977  input-output  table,  Matriz  de
Insumo-Producto  de la  Economia  Chilena: 1977,  ODEPLAN. The  model  contains
a five  sector  aggregation  of  the  twelve sector  data in  the  publication.
Data  on employment,  wage  bills, and  balance of  payments  statistics  came
from  Indicadores  Economicos  y Sociales:  1960-82  and  Cuentas  Nacionales  de
Chile: 1960-82,  both  published  by the  Banco  Central  de  Chile. The  capital
stock  data  and  capital-composition  matrix were  compiled  by the  researchers
at the  Universidad  Catolica  based  on  1977 data. World  price  indexes  for27
Chile's  exports  and imports  were  computed as  Divisia  indexes. The import
price  index  is the  trade-weighted  wholesale price  index  of  Chile's  main
trading  partners. The  export  price  index  is the  quantity  weighted  index  of
Chile's  export  prices.  Values for  both  indexes are  taken  from  Corbo
(1985).Table Al:  lie1l  Bjuatluc
1.  Prias  4.  Savlin  and Inastent
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